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Abstract: According to a chorus of authors, the human life-world is currently invaded 
by an avalanche of high-tech devices referred to as “emerging,” ”intimate,” or ”NBIC” 
technologies: a new type of contrivances or gadgets designed to optimize cognitive or 
sensory performance and / or to enable mood management. Rather than manipulating 
objects in the outside world, they are designed to influence human bodies and brains 
more directly, and on a molecular scale. In this paper, these devices will be framed 
as ‘extimate’ technologies (both intimate and external; both embedded and foreign; 
both life-enhancing and intrusive), a concept borrowed from Jacques Lacan. Although 
Lacan is not commonly regarded as a philosopher of technology, the dialectical rela-
tionship between human desire and technological artefacts runs as an important thread 
through his work. Moreover, he was remarkably prescient concerning the blending of 
life science and computer science, which is such a distinctive feature of the current 
techno-scientific turn. Building on a series of Lacanian concepts, my aim is to develop 
a psychoanalytical diagnostic of the technological present. Finally, I will indicate how 
such an analysis may inform our understanding of human life and embodiment as such.
Key words: emerging technologies, NBIC technologies, philosophy of technology, 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, philosophical anthropology
1. Introduction: The Current Techno-Scientific Blitz
In the opening scene of the science fiction novel Accelerando (Stross 2005), ICT 
wizard Manfred arrives at Amsterdam Central Station with eyeballs “powered up” 
(3) and equipped with high-tech glasses which keep him acutely up-to-date, so 
that he lives minutes, days, or even weeks into other people’s future, assimilating 
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gigabytes of information unceasingly, just to stay current. Soon he encounters 
like-minded early adopters of smart technologies, spreading “clouds of electronic 
emissions” as they move about (4). Accelerando reads like a literary laboratory, 
exploring an emerging future with Manfred as our guide or self-appointed re-
search subject.
Readers who find Accelerando too futuristic might visit websites where en-
hancement products are presented, such as THYNC,1 allegedly allowing consum-
ers to manage their moods, providing calm or energy “on demand” by monitoring 
and electromagnetically influencing brainwaves with the help of a small (“science-
proven”) neuro-signalling device (“the most transformative consumer technology 
to come out of Silicon Valley in a long time”; “The first wearable technology that 
changes the way you feel”). In minutes, the website tells us, vibes propagated 
by this device allow you to relax or to invigorate yourself, or they may help you 
through your day, combining high-tech neuroscience with an elegant lifestyle. Is 
it a placebo? Maybe not.
Some of the emerging innovations presented in the literature or on the web 
may seem phantasmatic and far-fetched, others fairly trivial, but all in all, they 
raise the question (addressed during an expert meeting organised by the Council of 
Europe, for instance)2 of how human existence and the life-world will be affected 
(or infected) by this upcoming avalanche of high-tech, miniature devices known 
as “converging,” “emerging,” “empowering,” “intimate,” or “NBIC”3 technologies 
(Roco and Bainbridge 2003; Van Est et al. 2014) designed to optimise cognitive 
performance, sensory functioning, and mood management, while at the same time 
providing connectivity with global informational networks. As the prolific Hege-
lian-Marxist-Lacanian philosopher Slavoj Žižek argued, an extraordinary cultural 
change is taking place right in front of our eyes; a ‘blitz’ of innovations is being 
introduced into our socio-cultural environment (Žižek 2010, 327). How will this 
surging technological unfolding affect our being-in-the-world?
This issue will be addressed from a Lacanian psychoanalytical perspective, 
which may come as a surprise. Jacques Lacan is not commonly regarded as a 
philosopher of technology and his oeuvre tends to be bypassed in this area of 
research.4 Moreover, Lacanian psychoanalysis is often associated with the lin-
guistic turn pervading post-structuralism, focusing on language and the symbolic 
order rather than on technical “things” (Verbeek 2005). And indeed, at first glance, 
Lacan’s oeuvre seems to deal almost exclusively with discourse and signifiers. 
Insofar as it is object-oriented at all, it is concerned with fairly enigmatic enti-
ties, deprived of materiality and tangibility: with the object a rather than with 
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objects, and with the Thing rather than with things (concepts which will be clari-
fied below). On closer inspection, however, the dialectical relationship between 
human desire and technological artefacts runs as an important thread through his 
work. He was remarkably prescient, moreover, concerning the blending of life sci-
ence and computer science as a distinctive feature of the current techno-scientific 
turn. His writings and seminars are particularly well poised, I will argue, to help 
us come to terms with the ongoing techno-cultural transitions fuelled by NBIC 
technologies now pervading human existence.
The design of this paper is as follows. First, I will outline the profile of this 
new genre of devices in more detail, framing them as ‘extimate’ technologies: 
both intimate and external; both embedded and foreign; both life-enhancing and 
intrusive (cf. Zwart 2015a). Next, I will focus on a key ingredient of a psycho-
analytic understanding of technology, namely the concept of the uncanny, which 
comes into play whenever technical contrivances (traditionally seen as extensions, 
supplements or substitutes of human body parts) come too close, and / or be-
come too biocompatible, too real. Subsequently, the basic contours of a Lacanian 
philosophy of technology will be presented, focusing on the dialectical interplay 
between electronic contrivances and human craving. Building on this dialectics, 
I will assess extimate technologies (i.e., wearable or implantable ‘gadgets’) from 
a Lacanian perspective. Finally, I will flesh out what this analysis entails for our 
understanding of human embodiment as such.
2. An Avalanche of Gadgets
To determine the profile of emerging NBIC gadgets in more detail, Radical Evolu-
tion by science author Joel Garreau (2005) provides an optimal starting point. 
Like Accelerando, the book purports to explore the emerging technological fu-
ture, but by visiting and interviewing some of the pioneer researchers directly 
involved in the transition. The message is that we are refashioning ourselves with 
the help of embedded devices, from miniature self-monitoring contrivances and 
retinal implants (e.g., for infrared vision) up to mnemonics. We are approaching 
an inflection point in history, Garreau argues. For millennia, technologies were 
aimed toward the outward world, helping us to control and reshape the objects and 
environments we encountered. Now, however, the direction is suddenly reversed, 
as technologies are taking an inward turn. We ourselves (human bodies and brains) 
are increasingly becoming the targets of technological modifications. New con-
trivances have begun to merge with our minds, our memories, our metabolism, 
our moods, and even our personalities. We have entered the era of “engineered 
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evolution” (Garreau 2005, 6). A plethora of (more or less plausible, more or less 
futuristic) exemplifications is presented and assessed in Garreau’s panorama. One 
of the most radical includes an additional chromosome to be inserted into the 
nuclei of our cells, providing additional plug-in-points as it were, in which genetic 
modules can be implanted so as to equip ourselves with additional features: a uni-
versal delivery vehicle for bio-molecular interventions, including on-off switches 
that can be activated by signals coming from wearable electronic gadgets (117).
Similar prospects are invoked by a recent Rathenau Report (Van Est et al. 
2014). Electronic gadgets are shrinking in size, coming closer, becoming wear-
able, the authors argue. They are still mostly just on the outside, on our skin, but 
cochlear implants and deep brain stimulation electrodes have already entered our 
bodies. NBIC technologies have begun to monitor and modify daily behavioural 
repertoires and their invention has been heralded by a whole chorus of authors. 
The relationships between technologies and human bodies are becoming increas-
ingly “intimate” Lucie Dalibert (2014) argues. New technologies are pervading 
the lifeworld, they are becoming us; the concept of a prosthetic no longer captures 
the intimate relations people have with these wearable machines, almost continu-
ous with our bodies (Turkle 2003). We are becoming increasingly dependent on 
these tiny, subtle computers, so demanding that we seem forced to focus our daily 
attention on our (increasingly intimate) relationships with them (Turkle 2004). 
Rather than extending the body, as traditional prosthetics tend to do, these gadgets 
are oriented towards incorporation (De Preester 2011). The line between human 
subjects and technological artefacts is dramatically blurred by the introduction of 
miniature machines that easily fit into and become part of our lives (Tomasi 2008). 
Micro-implants, health monitoring technologies and Google Glass are just a few 
examples of these new gadgets that are increasingly getting closer to, or even 
penetrating our corporeal surfaces, giving rise to an intimate interplay between 
bodies, organs, and technologies (Lettow 2011).
Similar developments are addressed by Žižek in several of his books. The 
current trend in electronic devices, he argues, is towards their invisibility, allow-
ing them to fit imperceptibly into everyday environments (Žižek 2012, 16). They 
are everywhere and nowhere, disappearing from view, functioning smoothly, fully 
interwoven into the texture of daily life. We might equip ourselves with a third eye, 
for instance, a small camera hidden in our clothing or floating about, as a partial 
object torn from its socket. Gadgets will increasingly become part of our direct 
self-experience, moreover, decentering us ‘from within.’ Instead of influencing 
human beings via texts, images, or sounds (via ‘culture’), these gadgets purport 
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to influence bio-molecular processes much more directly (Žižek 2009, 175), so 
that external influences appear to come from inside, indistinguishable from inner 
drives. Moods and emotions will increasingly be generated or thwarted through 
direct excitation of particular neuronal centres, with the help of drugs, electrical 
impulses, or electromagnetic waves. This allows us to evade the hazardous detour 
via reality (trying to gratify desires with the help of recalcitrant external objects) 
and to live up to the ‘pleasure principle’ (i.e., the unconscious urge towards sat-
isfaction) more effectively, with little or no concessions to the ‘reality principle’ 
(i.e., the willingness to postpone or abstain from gratification): happiness achieved 
with neuro-chemical precision. The body has lost its former impenetrable density 
and has become technologically manageable and transformable (Žižek 2012, 22; 
cf. Miller 2001)
As one of his many examples, Žižek mentions a device that allows us to 
eavesdrop on our brain’s “digital crackle” with the help of electrodes, transmitting 
signals to a computer that reads the brain’s “inner voice” telepathically (Žižek 
2009, 192). One day such electrodes, skin-born or even implanted into neocortical 
language centres, may transmit this inner voice directly to a machine so that we 
become short-circuited with our environment, bypassing the human voice but also 
hard copy writing or electronic messages (in Lacanian terminology: the ‘symboli-
cal order’).
Another example mentioned by Žižek is SixthSense, a tiny wearable mobile 
webcam produced at MIT that turns all surfaces into screens onto which informa-
tion can be projected (Žižek 2010, 337). Any surface in front of us may become 
a PC screen. Photos can be snapped and saved. The world becomes a multi-touch 
surface, while the Internet supplies additional data allowing us to orient ourselves. 
Information is projected directly onto real objects. In museums, for instance, not 
only guides and headphones but even our own memory system will become in-
creasingly redundant, as contextual explanations can be projected onto the exhib-
its directly by touching them, with Big Other (i.e., the transpersonal, electronic, 
overarching, normative as well as informative infrastructures of the global techno-
sphere) continuously filling in the gaps. But information also streams in the ob-
verse direction. We are constantly uploading observations and interpretations into 
computers. There is a constant migration of content, ideas, and insights from wet 
in vivo towards electronic in silico environments, eventually amounting to what 
Žižek refers to as digital “metempsychosis”: the migration of the human psyche 
into (small and wearable) computers (Žižek 2009, 194).5
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In short, according to a chorus of authors, humanity is approaching a turning 
point, a radical cultural transmutation. Although NBIC gadgets are often presented 
as enabling devices, as means of communication and interaction, they increasingly 
appear to use us, not only to function effectively, but also to reproduce, proliferate, 
and multiply themselves (Žižek 2010, 132). These gadgets will spread even if they 
prove damaging, toxic, or addictive in the long run. What makes these devices 
so uncanny is their proximity, ubiquity, and intrusiveness. Eventually, they may 
achieve total digital control over our daily lives (Žižek 2010, 327).
Basically, what is claimed is that the general direction of technological de-
velopment has dramatically shifted. Ernst Kapp (1877), founding father of the 
philosophy of technology, once argued that technology is directed from the inside 
(the sphere of human desire) towards the outside (the realm of recalcitrant natural 
objects), so that tools and instruments are extensions or exteriorisations of bodily 
organs, allowing humans to control and manipulate targeted items in the environ-
ment (Steinert 2015). A hammer, for instance, is basically a robust extension of a 
human fist, as exemplified by the iron prosthetic supplement of Götz von Berlich-
ingen, the German knight to whom Johann Wolfgang Goethe devoted one of his 
first plays. Or, to mention a more contemporary example, the Samurai katana, so 
skillfully employed by Uma Thurman in the Kill Bill movies to take revenge upon 
her perpetrators (by chopping off arms and legs and tearing out eyes), is basi-
cally an ultra-sharp extension of her nails (on fingers and toes). Such technology 
basically acts as a mechanisation of the organic, eventually transforming human 
beings into “prosthesis-gods” (Freud 1948).
Currently, however, we experience a dramatic reversal of the vector of 
technology from extension towards incorporation (De Preester 2011). Miniature 
gadgets are now moving from the outside (the lab environments where they are 
produced) towards the inside (the human life-world, or even the human body). 
They are directed towards ourselves; they are entering our bodies and brains. The 
micro-mechanic becomes implanted and embedded within the organic, and may 
gradually optimise or even replace our most intimate organic components. We 
ourselves are becoming the targets of this change, which is meant to result in in-
creased plasticity (and reduced recalcitrance) of human embodiment. The ongoing 
technological revolution entails a process of miniaturization, culminating in the 
colonisation of the human body (which quickly loses its impenetrability) with the 
help of bio-molecular or nanotech implants, i.e., technologies that actually inhabit 
us (Virilio 1998; Webster 2002).
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These new technologies emphatically present themselves as user-friendly, 
as intimate and empowering life-style gadgets. These products of neurological, 
nano-technological, and bio-molecular research are infinitesimally small, rather 
than forbiddingly huge, and allegedly quite willing to fold, embed, and adapt 
themselves to our predilections. However, precisely this invokes suspicion. In 
a Heideggerian vein, one could argue that the danger no longer resides in the 
threat that something will go wrong, but rather in the possibility that nothing will 
go wrong, because these gadgets function so smoothly and convincingly (Žižek 
2009, 195). In an era of tissue engineering, biomaterials, and nanomedicine, items 
such as pacemakers, artificial heart valves, and cochlear implants are the first pro-
totypes of invasive contrivances which the near future has in store for us. The 
micro-mechanic becomes embedded in the organic to such an extent that biology 
and technology are merging on the molecular level. Bio-electronic implants may 
allow paraplegic patients to walk again, but such devices may also ‘optimise’ what 
we now regard as normal functioning, so that the boundaries between therapy and 
enhancement become blurred. Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS), for instance, which 
uses surgically implanted and battery-operated pulse generators (IPG) to deliver 
electrical stimulation to specific areas in the brain (brain pacemakers so to speak), 
may act as portable stimulators for mood modulation (Schlaepfer et al. 2008; 
Schlaepfer et al. 2013; Lakhan and Callaway 2010) by boosting the “plasticity” 
of neural systems (Malabou 2008). Indeed, organic brain components (“carbon-
based neurons”) may be supplemented or (partially) replaced by bio-electronic 
implant technology (Kurzweil 1999): evolution by hyper-technical means.
For a Lacanian psychoanalytic diagnostics of this development, the concept 
of the uncanny seems an obvious starting point. It was introduced into the phi-
losophy of technology by Martin Heidegger (1953), but first of all employed by 
Sigmund Freud (1947) and subsequently taken up by Lacan, who forged his own 
version as we will see: the concept of extimacy (Lacan 2006).
3. Gadgets and the Uncanny
Heidegger has already argued, in Introduction to Metaphysics (published in 19536 
but built on Sophocles’s Antigone, written in or around 441 B.C.), that the tech-
nological prowess of human beings is disconcertingly uncanny. Whereas nature is 
δεινός (i.e., terrifying, forbidding), the most awesome and overpowering entity on 
Earth (τo δεινότατοn) is us ourselves. Initially, technology tended to ‘fold’ itself to 
nature, so that biomedicine basically aimed to assist the human body in restoring 
or maintaining its natural health (Heidegger 1967), employing artisanal technolo-
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gies that were still part of a ‘familiar’ world (heimlich, in German); but gradu-
ally the sway of Western technology over nature has become definitely uncanny 
(unheimlich). We no longer feel at ease in man-made technological environments, 
but rather experience chronic discontent as we ourselves become increasingly tar-
geted by an enframing force (Gestell) turning us into a standing reserve of human 
resources, the raw material of a global technological system currently unfolding. 
We are inescapably thrown out of our familiar dwelling into hypermodern exis-
tence, as vulnerable and fragile beings, saved by, but also irrevocably infected by 
technology.
Compared to the technologies that Heidegger was assessing, the ontologi-
cal physiognomy of emerging gadgets has noticeably changed. Their newness or 
discontinuity resides in their smallness and smoothness, in combination with their 
vector of operation: directly oriented towards ourselves. Technology is no longer 
threatening because it is awesome, but rather because it is subtle, and the new 
transformative power is focused on our own organism, on a molecular scale. The 
uncanny dimension of technology no longer resides in its monstrosity or enormity, 
and the archetypal example is no longer the hideous machine or the monstrous hy-
droelectric plant. Rather, what makes these gadgets uncanny is their minuteness, 
their precision, their ubiquity, and their pervasiveness. As David Gunkel and Paul 
Taylor (2014) phrase it, the current pervasive ubiquity of electronic-informational 
gadgets culminates in an enframing of human existence as Dasign. We increas-
ingly feel overwhelmed and pervaded by this novel mode of enframing, so that 
these new devices, affecting the dialectical interplay of technology and human 
desire on the molecular scale, may perhaps be referred to as hyper-uncanny.
In order to come to terms with the molecularised biocompatibility of NBIC 
technologies, the concept of the uncanny as coined by Freud proves relevant. Al-
though developed in an aesthetical context, the concept seems especially apt to 
capture instances of uneasiness and anxiety provoked by biotechnological ma-
nipulations (Assoun 1997). Etymologically speaking, Freud (1947) argues, the 
uncanny is that which used to be familiar, but from which we became estranged; 
that which should have remained hidden, but which has now become disclosed. 
First and foremost, it is that which emerges in the boundary zone between the arti-
ficial and the natural, the living and the non-living. To further develop his concept, 
Freud refers to the story The Sandman by E. T. A. Hoffmann, about the automaton 
Olimpia (the term robot had not been invented yet). Notably, the uncanny applies 
to body parts that seem easily detachable, such as Olimpia’s implantable eyes. For 
Freud, the experience of the uncanny eventually amounts to castration anxiety, i.e., 
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the concern that via the enframing of human bodies as aggregates of detachable 
and replaceable parts, items of intimate value (‘partial objects’ such as penises, 
eyes, or breasts) may be removed or replaced.
This lead was taken up by Lacan, albeit in the Hegelian sense of Aufhebung 
(sublation); for Lacan adopted, but at the same time thoroughly reframed the 
Freudian idea. In his seminar on anxiety, for instance, Lacan (2004) discusses two 
examples of religious art in which mutilated bodies are depicted: two portraits 
of female martyrs, painted by the Spanish Baroque artist Francisco de Zurbarán 
(1598–1664), namely Sainte Lucia, carrying her severed eyeballs on a plate, and 
Sainte Agatha, carrying her severed breasts on a similar plate. These parts had 
been violently removed in the context of religious persecutions. Such uncanny 
iconic visualisations confirm a basic subliminal anxiety concerning the detach-
able nature of the items involved. As stand-alone objects, removed and alienated 
from the body, they become obscene exhibits: too visible, too obtrusive and too 
close-up. For Lacan, however, the uncanny takes us far beyond the realm of aes-
thetics. The concept may especially be employed to address experiences invoked 
by technologies that affect human embodiment, such as transplantation medicine 
or synthetic biology (Zwart 2012; 2014). Uncanny is a removable body part that 
becomes too real.
4. Lacan’s Philosophy of Technology in Outline
From a Lacanian perspective, humans emerge not as entities who have something 
which (other) animals lack (rationality, self-consciousness, big brains, a soul, etc.), 
but rather as beings who lack something which (other) animals have (a natural at-
tunement or correspondence between instinct and Umwelt, between bodily needs 
and habitat; Zwart 2014; 2015b). Humans are born prematurely into this world, 
unable to either walk or talk. Even as adults, they cannot sleep without blankets 
nor trust their instincts. Although equipped with freely moveable hands, much 
of their time is spent on artificial crutches known as furniture (chairs, beds, etc.; 
Žižek 2010, 87). Humans are unhappy, stunted creatures from the very outset: ‘di-
vided,’ craving, and tormented subjects (in Lacanian algebra: $), suffering from a 
chronic misfit between what they desire and what is expected of them. And rather 
than solve our problems, technology (once unleashed) will reveal and amplify this 
radical imbalance, this primal discord at the very core of human existence (Žižek 
2012, 109).
In other words, Lacanian psychoanalysis basically concurs with the view of 
Arnold Gehlen and others of humans as deficient beings or Mängelwesen (Gehlen 
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1962) whose “organ inferiority” (Adler 1927) becomes compensated by culture, 
language, and contrivances: by the symbolic order, providing a life-line, a pro-
tective shelter against the threatening Real: technology as “vulnerability coping” 
(Coeckelbergh 2015b). But compensations inevitably become sources of malaise 
in their own right, not only because language (often embedded in communication 
devices) dramatically falters as a rule (due to our inability to articulate or come to 
terms with our desire), but also because of culture’s inherent tendency to become 
excessive, giving rise to overcompensation, so that rather than serving us, the 
techno-symbolic order haunts us and preys on us (Zwart 2015b). We are not only 
fundamentally dependent upon language, but even “sick with language,” as Žižek 
(2010, 83) phrases it. From a Lacanian perspective, language is a commanding 
mechanism, cleaving and infecting subjects, relentlessly colonizing their world.
In the techno-cultural ubicomp environment of today, where language and 
culture becomes embodied in high-tech contrivances (Coeckelbergh 2015a), this 
dialectics continues to unfold. For Lacan, human subjects are neither autonomous 
agents (who merely use certain artefacts to realise their goals), nor beautiful souls 
(who find themselves besieged by a relentlessly advancing technological culture). 
Rather, we are chronically divided subjects from the very start, craving for some-
thing (e.g., a missing object) which seems irrevocably lost. This object loss builds 
on a primordial experience of separation from parts of ourselves that we have 
been deprived of (Lacan 1966–1967, 842ff.), which results in a chronic gap and is 
invaded by desire and ‘sutured’ by technology. The classical (albeit farcical) de-
scription of this primordial separation experience is Aristophanes’s famous myth 
about hominid beings who (at the start of the humanisation process) were cleft in 
two, as recorded in Plato’s Symposium (Plato 1996; cf. Lacan 2001b), giving rise 
to a desperate yearning for the lost complement, as a basic thrust of culture.
This dialectics of technology, subjectivity, and desire already surfaces in one 
of Lacan’s earlier texts entitled Familial Complexes in the Formation of the In-
dividual (Lacan 2001a), where he discusses the complex of separation (from the 
mother’s body). As foetuses, Lacan argues, humans nest as parasites inside the 
motherly womb, where all vital needs are lavishly met (Lacan 2001a, 30; cf. Lacan 
1966–1967, 848). Separation (i.e., the birth trauma) is a choking experience and 
although breast-feeding is meant to uphold a certain level of proximity and intima-
cy, new experiences of separation and frustration await the newborn child. These 
may give rise to various symptoms later in life, such as alcoholism, anorexia, or 
other enacted refusals of the questionable replacements offered as substitutes for 
the irretrievably lost object: the placenta, the primordial nipple or breast, and so 
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forth; in Lacanian algebra: the object a. The persevering refusal of this inevitable 
separation (from a prototypically ‘lost object’) fuels repetitive efforts to artificially 
restore parasitic, nourishing relationships later in life, revolving around the scar or 
void that was left behind, outlining the lost object’s haunting image.7
Thus, during extra-uterine existence, humans frantically aim to establish liv-
ing conditions which mimic the lost original position as convincingly as possible.8 
And it is here that culture and technology step in, whose basic objective is to re-
store (to a certain extent) the vanished protective sphere. Yet, as Freud (1948) had 
already argued in Civilisation and its Discontents, this basic program of culture 
and technology is bound to fall short, because aside from solving certain prob-
lems, technological artefacts will inevitably introduce a host of new complications 
as well. Because we easily become dependent on these substitutes, they become 
sources of discontent in their own right, while human existence continues to be 
marked by frustration, frantic longing, and chronic desire.
This situation is captured by Lacan’s ‘matheme of desire’: $ ◊ a, where $ 
(‘barred S’) represents the ‘split’ (tormented, craving) subject and a the lost, im-
possible, inexorable object (the object-cause of human desire); while the diamond 
(lozenge, poinçon) in the middle can be read as an arrow pointing in both direc-
tions, so that desire, besides functioning as a vector oriented towards the missing 
object’s coordinates, may also be aroused by particular items which present them-
selves as alluring substitutes, making us aware of what we lack and conveying the 
promise that the script of our core phantasy can still be realised.
The idea of the missing part (the absent ‘partial object’) first and foremost 
applies to the placenta, as we have seen: our primordial life-saving, organic exten-
sion symbolising the lost object a in a rather profound way (Lacan 1973, 221). 
In his Seminar on anxiety, Lacan argues that the first primordial trauma is indeed 
the experience of being born (Lacan 2004, 362): the exodus from the womb, the 
experience of being slit from the placenta, and the separation anxiety resulting 
from this. From the newborn child’s perspective, the motherly breast emerges as a 
kind of externalised placenta, loosely attached to the maternal body as a soothing 
remainder: something which actually seems to belong to the body of the child, 
something to which he or she seems entitled (Lacan 1966–1967, 256).
Thus, during the nursing stage, young children still experience themselves as 
fused, more or less, with the mother’s body. They do not yet perceive themselves 
as fully separate entities and do not yet see the breast as an ‘object,’ but rather as 
something which somehow continues to belong to their own corporeal self. Dur-
ing breast feeding, the breast and nipple stand out as temporary extensions whose 
A Lacanian Analysis of Pervasive Gadgets 35
surface smoothly folds itself to the oral mucous membrane. But this experience 
of fusion is illusory and untenable. The separation experience becomes repeti-
tive, giving rise to additional frustrations. Replacement of the organic object (i.e., 
the mother’s breast) soon becomes an option, and the soothing function may be 
transferred to a doe, for instance,9 or to artificial comforters, feeding bottles, and 
so on; this is where technology enters the scene. The organic original becomes a 
replaceable, transferrable (“cessible”) object (Lacan 2004, 363); replaceable by 
substitutes (plastic or otherwise) purporting to mimic it, in function as well as in 
shape.10 Technology thus produces a host of potential substitutes: technologically 
reproducible partial objects, alluring but deceiving replacements of the real (lost) 
thing. These substitutes cannot really gratify desire, however, and the awareness 
of the painful, insatiable loss will continue to torment us.
For Lacan, building on Freud, another instance of a faltering object, unleash-
ing the dynamics of human desire, is the phallus. Although unlike Freud, Lacan 
emphasises that it does not refer to the (physical, visible, organic) penis, conceived 
in more traditional psychoanalytic accounts as a male anatomical ‘privilege’ (Ver-
haeghe 2001, 10), but rather to the phallus as a symbolical item, functioning as an 
irretrievably lost (and only partially replaceable) spectral thing (whose absence is 
denoted as: –φ). The phallic object a is not something we may or may not ‘have,’ 
ready at hand, but rather something whose presence and performance remain 
highly precarious: something anatomical only in the etymological sense of the 
term (ἀνα-τομία as referring to bodily items that can be or have been cut away). As 
Žižek phrases it, notwithstanding its obstinacy, the (phallic) object a has no posi-
tive ontological consistency (Žižek 2010, 69), so that we are chronically in need of 
stand-ins. Consider, for instance, the stereotypical gun in Western movies, or the 
enchanted sword in early medieval or Samurai tales, or Uma Thurman’s katana, 
previously mentioned. For Lacan, (the lack of) the phallic object (–φ) basically 
refers to a vacancy at the core of human existence, amounting to the inability of 
individuals to overcome their impasses and achieve their goals, i.e., to satisfy the 
desires of others as well as of themselves. Various objects (artificial replacements) 
purport to suture this void (Ragland 1995, 189) and technology provides us with 
a plethora of questionable compensations to counteract the chronic malaise (in 
Lacanian algebra: a/–φ). In other words, the function of technology is not primar-
ily to satisfy bodily (biological) needs, but rather to produce alluring semblances, 
enticing ‘objects of desire,’ arousing in us a craving that goes beyond the mere 
satisfaction of physiological urges, promising singular forms of jouissance which 
are currently denied to us. Although the desirable object (a particular gadget, for 
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instance) may easily be mistaken for the thing itself, it is actually a lure, invested 
with libido and fetishized by desire.
The common factor of various (oral, anal, or phallic) replacements is that they 
are connected with experiences of loss as well as with bodily orifices, pointing out 
the gaps (Verhaeghe 2001). Moreover, aside from the lost objects discussed so far, 
Lacan adds two additional items to the set, namely the scopic object a (the gaze 
of the Other, associated with the eye as an organ and the pupil as an orifice) and 
the auditory object a (the voice of the Other, associated with the ear as an organ 
and the auditory channel as an orifice).11 The missing item (–φ) becomes a vector 
of desire, giving rise to a relentless quest for the alluring entity that technological 
substitutes purport to mimic. Lacan connects this with the Freudian mechanism of 
displacement (Verschiebung) and with the linguistic concept of ‘metonymy’: the 
tendency of desire to continuously shift its target, to remain dissatisfied, to keep 
craving for ‘something else’; resulting in endless deferral, so that the insatiable 
quest for the lost object becomes an interminable adventure.
What makes technological substitutes alluring is their promise to fill up the 
emptiness resulting from the loss (a/–φ). The disavowal of the inexorable nature 
of the loss gives rise to an interminable process of multiplication, a production line 
of substitutes, purporting to fill the gap (Žižek 2009, 61). New high-tech options 
for replacement will continue to become available in the future, claiming to mimic 
the lost original as closely as possible. In accordance with the matheme of desire 
($ ◊ a), subjects will cling to them, fuelled by the unconscious conviction that 
the phantasmatic object may somehow still exist. Thus, technological experiments 
become ‘practices of desire’ and objects which to others may seem ordinary enti-
ties (say, an iPhone, or a particular gadget used for gaming) may function as the 
object-cause of desire, a metonymic stand-in for the lost object, which left behind 
a thinly coated, discomforting void. The subject’s desire may become fixated on a 
singular object in an obsessive manner, so that all daily activities begin to circulate 
around it, resulting in a radical narrowing of focus, and in the elevation of a minor 
activity into a time-absorbing end in itself (Žižek 2012, 127). The gadget becomes 
a fetish: an object that purports to ‘suture’ the missing part (a/–φ).
5. Extimacy
The newness of emerging NBIC technologies basically resides in the fact that, as 
alluring gadgets, they allow us to monitor and manipulate our own bodies more 
directly, as we have seen. But this is not altogether new, one might argue. Bio-
medical interventions have always endorsed the objective of restoring the integrity 
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and functionality of the human organism through technological interventions, and 
aside from the partial objects discussed above (placenta, breast, phallus, etc.), 
various other organs or body parts may become disconnected or dysfunctional, 
for various reasons, so that craving subjects may put their hope on supplements or 
substitutes designed to replace the faltering item.
The latter is definitely true. Lacan explicitly discusses transplantation medi-
cine, for instance (Lacan 2004, 363), stressing that developments in this area move 
forward very quickly and will continue to surprise us. He explicitly discusses the 
harvesting of organs from brain-dead persons, artificially kept alive for no other 
purpose (364). In the case of a faltering organ, a kind of emptiness or gap emerges 
in the intimacy of our body, which Lacan refers to as a “vacuole” (2006, 232), a 
sinister, empty space once occupied by the now dysfunctional body part (–φ), so 
that the vector of desire pushes the craving subject towards a possible life-line, an 
organ implant: the object a of transplantation medicine, in accordance with the 
matheme a/–φ (Zwart 2014). But the implant is likely to prove a highly precarious 
‘solution’ and the new organ (due to detection and rejection by the body’s immune 
system) is bound to become an issue of concern in its own right (and a candidate 
for future replacements).
Here again, the new genre of devices purports to provide craving subjects 
with solutions that seem more lenient and smoother, and definitely less organic. 
NBIC devices are biomimetic rather than corporeal, optimising the functioning 
of tissues and organs via molecular and electronic signals. No doubt the actual 
effectiveness of these solutions may often prove highly questionable, due to the 
recalcitrance of bodily existence resulting in (foreseeable or unforeseeable) ‘com-
plications.’ Still, the scenario must be taken seriously that some of these gadgets 
will indeed be able to function flawlessly and convincingly in an integrated way, 
as optimising substitutes and objects of desire. In that case, a new dimension is 
added to the debate. As biomimetic replacements they may become increasingly 
intimate, while at the same time remaining alienating artefacts. In short, they 
become ‘extimate’ technologies: both intimate and external; both embedded and 
foreign; both life-saving and intrusive. This ambiguity is captured by the concept 
of ‘extimacy,’ a portmanteau term conjoining the notion of intimacy with that of 
radical exteriority (Lacan 2006, 224, 249), allowing us to stipulate the ambiguous 
position of the “extimate object a” (249) and its substitutes.
Like Freud, Lacan refers to Hoffmann’s “visionary fantasy,” i.e., the story of 
The Sandman to further elaborate his concept (2004, 364). Olimpia’s replaceable 
eyes, which apparently can be removed from and reinserted into their sockets, are 
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both fascinating and deterring, both alluring and disconcerting. As transferrable 
objects a, they exemplify the uncanny par excellence. But, Lacan argues, this story 
reflects the age of the mechanical human-machine, to which the Freudian period 
still belonged. In the current era, the focus of attention has shifted to a new type of 
electronic contrivances, of which ELIZA, the computerised psychotherapist with a 
Rogerian (client-centred) voice, developed at MIT and named after Eliza Doolittle 
(the heroine of Shaw’s Pygmalion, with the hyperplastic voice), provides a more 
provocative and up-to-date example (Lacan 1966–1967, 27). The extimate object 
a of emerging technologies is no longer something organic, but rather something 
small, communicative, elegant, carefully designed and containing a miniature, 
chip-sized computer.
In the course of the twentieth century, Lacan (2004) argues, various objects 
a, such as the human gaze and voice, became externalisable and transferrable with 
help of cameras, voice recorders, and similar devices. Although nowadays we 
have sufficiently familiarised ourselves with such techniques, they were initially 
experienced as fairly shocking: evoking both fascination and concern. For indeed, 
what used to be natural and familiar (‘heimlich,’ namely eyes, voice, etc.) became 
technologically reproducible. In the current era, artificial substitutes of the other’s 
gaze and voice have become ubiquitous, and the same has happened to oral or 
phallic objects of desire. We are surrounded by alluring (EAT ME! DRINK ME! 
USE ME!) objects on display around the globe. The human gaze and voice have 
even entered the stratosphere via satellites (1973, 305) and it has become virtually 
impossible to escape the sway of the electronically reproducible (de-humanised, 
but still human-like) voice and gaze of the Other.12
To some extent, all artefacts may come to play the role of object of desire. 
We may go as far back as Aristotle’s Physics where (in Book II) Aristotle argues 
that, whereas some things exist by nature, others are manufactured by human 
hands. A bedstead is Aristotle’s pet example of a man-made artefact. For although 
a bedstead is made from wood (from natural materials), the decisive component 
(the form) is artificial (human-made). And indeed, he adds jokingly, in case of pro-
creation, whereas humans will propagate humans, bedsteads are not expected to 
propagate bedsteads (Aristotle 1980, II.1., 115); since, should the wooden material 
prove to be alive and sprout, twigs and leaves rather than bedsteads will come up. 
In other words, for Aristotle, a bedstead is not primarily something which keeps us 
warm at night (thereby satisfying a mere biological need), but first and foremost 
an object of desire: a marriage bed, where conjugal relationships are consumed 
and children are conceived, i.e., a setting meant to create optimal conditions for 
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erotic pleasure. And if, twenty-five centuries later, posters in shop windows con-
vey the promise of airplanes eager to transport us to alluring white beaches and 
blue lagoons, the message is basically the same, although advanced technological 
infrastructures (computer networks, airports, airplanes, hotel facilities, etc.) must 
now be mobilised to realise our dreams.
But again, whereas bedsteads and airplanes are externalisations of desire, 
the new wave of ‘extimate’ technologies focus their attention far more directly on 
the increased manipulability of the human organism as such. This means that the 
time-old frantic quest for external replacements of the lost object a (the one thing 
that promises to make us whole) is now fuelled by a new type of target, while a 
new kind of vacuole emerges within the intimacy of our bodies: an emptiness 
which can allegedly be sutured by wearable or implantable, biocompatible and 
electronic gadgets (a/– φ). In the context of mood management, for instance, these 
gadgets may allow us to monitor synaptic biochemistry quite closely, while releas-
ing electro-magnetic currents or psycho-pharmaceuticals in response, acting on 
both sides of the matheme of desire ($ ◊ a) by producing an object that both targets 
and triggers the inner functioning of the subject.
Such technologically reproducible wearables or implants have already begun 
to enter our intimate life-worlds and bodies, as we have seen. In laboratories 
around the globe, smart watches, biochips, neuro-implants, etc. are already being 
developed. As these ‘intimate’ technologies are actually quite intrusive, extimacy 
seems a far more optimal term than intimacy. Extimate devices purport to as-
sist us in our frantic efforts to enjoy life, but at the same time, they are likely to 
become an object of intense concern: is the gadget still functioning properly? For 
indeed, should the extimate object falter, new intrusions are doubtlessly awaiting 
us. Moreover, as many of these gadgets connect their users to global networks, 
they enable permanent self-monitoring and self-surveillance, giving rise to an 
electronic super-ego: the voice and gaze (and helping hand) of the Big Other (Φ) 
on whom we increasingly come to depend, pointing out that we fail to enjoy life 
as we could and should.
In other words, from a Lacanian perspective, extimate devices play a multi-
factorial role. On the one hand, they act as seductive, yet questionable substitutes, 
purporting to replace the irretrievably lost object with a sophisticated version (a/–
φ). At the same time, they focus on the craving human subject ($) more directly 
and effectively than previous interventions. In contrast to traditional aphrodisiacs, 
for instance, new devices (substitutes of the phallic object a) may offer direct 
stimulation of the pleasure centres in the groin or brain to produce arousal and 
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/ or satisfaction (Žižek 2012). Thus science and technology purport to realise a 
complete scientific self-objectification of humanity, or as Žižek argues, the trans-
formation of humans into objects of control with the help of computerised devices, 
allowing individuals to live up to the relentless injunction to satisfy their wants.
6. Objects of Desire: Cybernetic Discontent
Because human technology is closely interwoven with language, societal expecta-
tions, and techno-scientific experimentation, Lacan sees it as fundamentally dif-
ferent from tool-use by (other) animals. We inhabit a self-made world, a global, 
metropolitan technotope on which we are highly dependent, surrounding our-
selves with commanding electronic devices (USE ME!). These gadgets stand out 
as weird objects, adding a new dimension to the ontology of things. For although 
ontologically speaking all things may speak to us, may light up in front of us, 
and may indicate their presence to us (Cole 2013), gadgets do so in a remarkably 
articulate, sophisticated, and insisting way. And it is through these gadgets that the 
commanding voices of politics, governance, and the market economy (Φ) sum-
mon and survey us. Instead of being mere instruments, these gadgets are beset 
with language, functioning as carriers of messages and claims: as an electronic 
superego, conveying and reinforcing the injunction to adapt our lives ever more 
rigorously to the emerging metropolis (literally: the mother-polis) whose advent 
they exemplify and announce.
Lacan made this point on May 13, 1970, when (before a crowd of Mao-
ist students) he discussed the famous Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong 
(better known as the ‘little red book’). Rather than being economically exploited 
by capitalism, Lacan argued, the working-classes are first and foremost bereft of 
a particular type of dexterity or know-how, connected with particular forms of 
technology: workers as operators of big machines processing the raw materials 
of nature. This type of work is becoming increasingly automated and redundant. 
Therefore, Lacan was struck by the fact that Mao’s booklet still purported to be 
a ‘manual’ (instructing readers how to manually operate machines). This, Lacan 
argued, seems outdated, as a new type of device is emerging: very small, function-
ing smoothly and completely forged by science, known as “gadgets” (1991, 174). 
As an example, Lacan referred to a tiny recording device someone in the audience 
was actually using to record his speech. As big machines are increasingly being 
replaced by or operated with the help of electronic devices (not handled manually, 
i.e., with our hands, but subtly touched by fingertips), traditional forms of indus-
trial know-how are quickly becoming obsolete, while ‘manuals’ inevitably lose 
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their effective and subversive potential. It is via these smooth, opaque devices that 
the voice of power (Φ) now speaks to us. Or as Lacan phrased it three years later 
(in Seminar XX): science produced a new wave of miniature “gadgets” (1975, 
104) and we have become (in a more radical sense than we are usually aware of) 
the subjects of these contrivances, which determine the elementary structures of 
contemporary existence.
Lacan’s fascination with gadgets goes back to Seminar II (1978), however, 
where the repercussions of the cybernetics-informatics revolution for human 
subjectivity are extensively addressed. Whereas the early modern (Cartesian) 
epoch (when the modern subject was born or invented) was still under the sway 
of mechanical machines giving rise to the mechanistic concept of the machine-
man (l’Homme-Machine), Lacan argues, we have now entered the era of cyber-
netic, computerised, and digital contrivances, intimately connected with language, 
mathematics, and computer codes (the ‘symbolic order’), so that the affinity and 
proximity between humans and machines becomes much more intense than many 
philosophers (on the basis of established anti-mechanistic biases) still seem to 
presume. Bodies and computer-like machines are increasingly and relentlessly 
merging. Rather than being mechanistic devices (along the lines of late-medieval 
horologia as described by Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century13 or early 
modern clockworks as developed by Huygens in 1656), these cybernetic gadgets 
are self-corrective, interactive mini-computers. And although their genealogy may 
be traced back to the calculation machines designed by Blaise Pascal, their cur-
rent pervasive omnipresence represents a “mutation” in the history of technology 
(Lacan 1978, 45). They provide us not only with new material things, but first and 
foremost with messages and input: with injunctions and information.
This concurs with Lacan’s reframing of unconscious desire in informational 
(post-Freudian) terms (instead of vitalistic ones). While for Freud the drives or 
instincts “originate from the somatic organisation, from the body” (so that the 
Id can be regarded as the inner animal, Freud 1941, 67), Lacan reconceptualises 
unconscious desire with the help of twentieth-century research fields such as lin-
guistics and cybernetics. The Lacanian unconscious is biological only in the sense 
of molecular biology: a post-Freudian research area involving messages and codes 
(i.e., molecular information, cf. Zwart 2013). The unconscious is structured like a 
language and desire is not framed as a biological ‘need’ (directed at certain organic 
objects or substances), but as a craving which emerges in the symbolical realm of 
informational circuits and signifiers, where gadgets ‘feed’ us with enticing cues.
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While Lacanian psychoanalysis discloses important aspects of NBIC tech-
nologies, these technologies reciprocally emphasise important dimensions of 
Lacan’s understanding of human subjectivity as well. NBIC gadgets highlight the 
informational-cybernetic nature of human desire as such. The symbolic world of 
human existence is an ambiance of electronic-cybernetic-informational machines, 
Lacan argues (1978, 63), and it is only due to such machines that we (as decentered 
subjects) can emerge. Indeed, even the brain itself is cybernetically redefined as 
a “homeostat” or buffer (“organe-tampon,” 1978, 96), mediating between uncon-
scious desire and external reality. From a Lacanian viewpoint, the unconscious is 
not an interior psychic ‘depth’ (as envisaged by depth psychology), but entangled 
in a pre-structuring discursive system (the discourse of the Other) and a close 
affinity can be discerned between the (structure and logic of the) unconscious and 
the (structure and logic of) gadgets, offering short-cuts for desire.
Lacan was initiated into cybernetics by structuralist scholars such as Claude 
Lévi-Strauss, but also by Georges Guilbaud, a Catholic mathematician whom he 
befriended in 1950 (Roudinesco 1993; Lafontaine 2007; Liu 2010) and who ac-
quainted him with the Moebius strip as the basic topological framework of human 
subjectivity (Roudinesco 1993, 469). While Friedrich Nietzsche (1980, §169) re-
garded the labyrinth as a model for our psychic “architecture,” Lacan envisioned 
both gadgets and the human subject as structured like a Moebius strip (Lacan 
2004, 161; 1973, 174): a pure surface or circuit, without termination, without hid-
den depths, but always with a reverse side, as something is always hidden from 
view, so that something else is always to be expected. Instead of reaching a final 
destination, subjects (challenged and prompted forth by signifiers) become en-
tangled in repetitive loops, finding themselves in similar positions time and again, 
even if they decide to move the other way.
Thus, human desire is not primarily a somatic phenomenon (a biological 
urge to consume certain ingredients, fluids or substances) and human subjects do 
not live “on bread alone,” as the Gospels phrase it (Matthew 4:4), but first and 
foremost on words and signifiers: symbolical input, provided by folding networks 
that coordinate the life-world. Lacan elevated psychoanalysis to the level of high-
tech (Lafontaine 2007, 35) by indicating how NBIC Gadgets allow the symbolic 
order (the discourse of the Other) to become embodied in electronic machinery 
(Schmidgen 1997). The object of desire (a) is definitely not something tangibly 
organic, as we have seen, but of a symbolical nature, in the linguistic-cybernetic 
sense of the term. And the primordial symbol par excellence, as Henning Schmid-
gen (1997) argues, is the zero14 or minus sign (-), signifying the absence of what 
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we inexorably lack, while at the same time realising a symbolical presence of that 
which is physically absent, paving the way for gadgets that promise to compensate 
the loss. The signifier (denoting presence or absence) obliterates the organic thing, 
as by indulging in symbolical games we may endure the demise of its tangible 
availability. Humans have always dwelled in a technological ambiance, but now 
“gadgetry” is becoming the new “dispositive” (Geoghegan 2011). And while hu-
mans increasingly communicate and interact via gadgets, the reverse seems no less 
true: gadgets and electronic networks communicate with each other via us.
This allows us to add precision to the ‘inward turn’ already outlined above. 
The traditional technological situation, as we have seen, is that of a particular 
organ supplemented by an instrument (ὄργανον in Greek) so as to make the out-
side world more handleable and survival-friendly, although this supplement often 
profoundly affects the human body and its organs in return, so that a process of 
co-evolution is unleashed: a complex interplay of the organic and the mechanic, 
of human embodiment and technology. In other words: while humans are reshap-
ing (humanising) the outside world, they actually also re-sculpt (domesticate) 
themselves as well, so that we are not only the product of a natural, but also of 
techno-cultural evolution. Our tools and contrivances, indeed our apparatus allow 
us to appear as subjects and human beings are, to a significant extent, self-made 
(Stiegler 2010; Zwart 2009; Lemmens 2015). But whereas so far this process un-
folded via externalising tools, we are now becoming the target of self-reengineer-
ing much more directly.
And this explains the ambivalent responses which emerging smart technolo-
gies evoke. On one hand we realise that, rather than posing a threat to human au-
tonomy and dignity, our subjectivity and cognition can only emerge and function 
within complex environments of technological artefacts, embedded in a plethora 
of social networks. From the very outset, human self-consciousness co-evolved in 
interaction with technology and the symbolic order. We have always been thrown 
into a world of self-made things and over the course of millennia, human intelli-
gence has become increasingly externalised and extra-somatised (via technology-
based innovations such as alphabets, handwriting, printing, typewriters, laptops, 
etc.). Therefore, as Žižek convincingly argues, instead of merely bemoaning the 
progressive externalisation of our mental capacities, we should focus on the en-
abling dimension as well: the more our capacities are transferred to machines, the 
more we emerge as subjects (Žižek 2012, 16). It is in interaction with artificial 
objects that we become ‘subjected.’ In principle, this also applies to the new wave 
of electronic gadgets through which the individual life-world becomes more inti-
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mately connected to global networks, thereby realising the ancient philosophical 
ideal of cosmopolitanism (Weltbürgerschaft).
And yet, at the same time, a decisive new turn seems to unfold. In the tradi-
tional situation, a clear distinction could still be upheld between the organic, the 
natural, and the biological on the one hand and the mechanical, the artificial, and 
the prosthetic on the other. But electronic gadgets disclose an intimate accessibil-
ity (and therefore vulnerability) of unconscious desire for the workings of these 
smart devices, finally pulling the image of the human-machine from metaphor 
to metamorphosis, from ‘utopia’ (or dystopia) to ‘science’ (Zwart 2009). While 
human bodies (once skilfully operating big machines) become targets of subtle 
technological modifications (or at least participants in an increasingly uneven 
game), a new collective superego is emerging, bombarding individuals with the 
injunction to enjoy life, excessively and to the fullest. In other words: $ is put to 
work, in order to live up to this relentless summons (Žižek 2012, 299), which can 
only be realised with the help of increasingly efficient equipment. Thus, we are 
faced with the emergence of a global metropolitan ‘mother-city,’ a gigantic, multi-
tasking, web-like ambiance, in which we are simultaneously exploited, surveyed, 
and spoiled. And this creates a metro-spherical ambiance of care and abundance (or 
even superabundance and overkill), an electronic-informational Gaia, represent-
ing a rupture with the constraining and restricting patriarchal societies of the past 
(from ancient Greek and Biblical versions up to the Faustian era of big machines). 
Bodies and life-worlds are colonised by the techno-symbolic order via gadgets as 
condensations, constantly absorbing and transmitting coded messages, although 
we will fail to realise the ancient Gnostic dream of transforming ourselves into 
virtual beings, radically cut off from the natural body (Žižek 2012, 167). Rather, 
due to various forms of recalcitrance, human beings may increasingly be outcom-
peted by (and compare unfavourably to) the smart machines, proliferating at such 
a high pace.
Thus, from a Lacanian perspective, what is so disquieting about these gadgets 
is that they come too close, due to their ability to mimic the obtrusively missing 
item so convincingly and smoothly. As alluring substitutes emerging in the outside 
world, they claim to address our deficiencies and longings in a disconcertingly 
straightforward manner, by revealing and reprogramming the molecular dynamics 
of embodied desire as such. In short, Lacan’s dialectics of technology and desire 
revolves around three decisive moments. First of all, the primordial traumatic ex-
perience of separation or object loss. Subsequently, the desire to replace the miss-
ing item with the help of substitutes, as objects of desire. And finally, the claim that 
A Lacanian Analysis of Pervasive Gadgets 45
newly emerging gadgets focus their attention on craving subjects fairly directly. In 
other words, these gadgets, while emerging as alluring objects of desire, also allow 
us to effectively modify the subject as such, so that they operate on both sides 
of the equation ($ ◊ a). What is especially disconcerting about these gadgets is 
the conviction that they may succeed where previous technologies failed, notably 
because, rather than simply providing us with yet another set of questionable sub-
stitutes, they purport to suture the impotence or lack much more directly, with the 
help of interactive, electronic, wearable, or implantable devices that are closing in 
on us, coming suspiciously close. They seem to mimic the irretrievably lost object 
far too smoothly, and this invokes an experience of uneasiness.
In many cases, these upcoming devices will surely remain erratic appendices 
that continue to stick out conspicuously, due to their failure to become really em-
bedded in the body as a whole (Žižek 2009, 122–23; 2012, 156). But the alterna-
tive scenario, namely that some of these gadgets may become embedded quite 
smoothly, efficiently, and intimately, must be taken into account as well. Even in 
such a case, however, the electronic replacement of the missing object is likely 
to prove a toxic lure, a damaging illusion in the end (as the object a remains an 
impossible, inaccessible, spectral object, forever eluding us). But still, as Žižek 
argues, even these deceiving substitutes may nonetheless on some occasions do 
us some good, such as providing us with the coordinates of our desire, teaching 
us how to (at least temporarily) domesticate the formula $ ◊ a, and how to track a 
provisional course for our aspiration of fulfilment, even if it proves vanity in the 
end (Žižek 2009, 62; 2010, 69–70).
7. Bιος and τέχνη: A Final Dialectical Twist
From a Lacanian perspective, it would be naïve to think that NBIC gadgets will 
allow us to overcome our corporeal and cognitive shortcomings, as various post-
humanistic scenarios suggest. As precision devices, they will prove both beneficial 
and toxic at the same time, and it is their inherent toxicity which tends to be 
obfuscated by post-humanistic proclamations of the advent of a bright and happy, 
hyper-technological and gadget-saturated future.
Moreover, adding yet another dialectical twist, one may argue that these 
gadgets, rather than introducing something definitely new into human existence, 
reveal or emphasise something which has been there from the very outset, namely 
extimacy not as a recent byproduct of emerging technologies, but as an eclipsed, 
endogenous dimension of human embodiment as such. Human bodies are inher-
ently pervaded by intrusive entities, either beneficial or toxic (usually both) in 
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a very profound way, and this already applies to our ‘natural’ organs. Extimate 
gadgets may undermine a reassuring, but imaginary view of the human body in 
its natural, unviolated state, thereby revealing an unsettling truth. Rather than 
unleashing a completely new situation (without precedent in the history of tech-
nology and evolution), extimate technologies actually allow us to acknowledge 
extimacy as a basic dimension of embodied life itself. The extimacy of partial 
objects is something Real, obfuscated perhaps by various fictitious images of the 
body’s wholeness, integrity, and inviolability, but now relentlessly brought out 
into the open, giving rise to a narcissistic offence, challenging our sense of dignity, 
individuality, and agency.
This already applies to the classical psychoanalytic set of ‘partial objects’ 
discussed above. The motherly breast, for instance, while providing a life-line 
to newborn infants, may well become a toxic, metastatic threat to the mothers 
themselves, an extimate object arousing suspicion, giving rise to practices like 
regular check-ups or self-monitoring, or even preventive removal, so as to forego 
cancer (the archetypal, demonic, organic threat from within). In other words, the 
ambivalent status of extimacy may already apply to this particular appendix-like 
organ as such.
As to the faeces (the anal object a), it is remarkable how, in recent years, 
human excrements became a focal point of attention in biomedical research no 
less than in psychoanalytic practice. Life scientists have taken to studying the gut 
microbiome (i.e., the millions of microorganisms (E. coli and others) inhabiting 
our intestines, responsible for our metabolism, functioning as benign intruders, 
but regarding us merely as their ecosystem) while human stool is now increasingly 
used as a diagnostic tool (for detecting colon cancer) or as a resource for therapy 
(as faecal microbiota transplants or faecal bacteriotherapy). In other words, what 
these developments reveal or confirm is the view of the anal object a as something 
which is both me and not–me, both familiar and repellent, both an item of waste 
and a gift, both detestable and valuable: a view that has been propagated by psy-
choanalytic literature from the very outset.
Testicles may be regarded as extimate ‘partial objects’ in a rather palpable 
manner and their extimate status is already underscored by their curious anatomi-
cal position, both inside and outside the body, drenching male bodies (notably 
during adolescence, but also later in life) in testosterone, a toxic substance, giving 
rise to excessive, unquenchable desire. But they may also function as model or-
gans whose modus operandi is mimicked by smart, wearable devices, worn on (or 
directly under) the skin, ejecting electronic signals or bioactive substances (as bio-
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chemical signals) into the human organism, urging tissues and organs to respond 
more adequately to recorded instances of deprivation or excess (as indicated by 
precision measurements), or simply to invoke specific moods of states of arousal 
(gadgets which function as clean, electronic, pseudo-organic ‘gonads’ as it were).
The phallus is the extimate “organ without a body” par excellence, as Žižek 
(2012, 78) phrases it, attached to bodies, but without really becoming an organic 
part, rather “sticking out as an excessive, incoherent supplement.” As a detachable 
organ, it is connected with gender in a rather flexible way, and both erotic literature 
and psychoanalytic practice inform us that the detachable, transferable phallus 
plays a key role in a plethora of erotic activities and phantasies, ranging from 
transvestism via masochism up to fetishism. Recently, it was discovered that role 
reversal (phallus transference) is not exclusively an ingredient of human eroticism. 
In a Brazilian cave, a research team discovered a case of intromittent sexual organ 
reversal among insects of the genus Neotrogla (Yoshizawa et al. 2014). While 
females have a highly elaborate, penis-like structure (a gynosome), an intromittent 
organ in males is lacking. In fact, these polyandrous females are equipped with 
various organs for grasping and holding reluctant males, coercively gripping their 
sternum, so as to procure gametes from their sperm storage organ (spermatheca) 
while, during the extended copulation process (40–70 hours), male bodies often 
become fatally mutilated. In the near future perhaps, as a case of what Freud called 
Anlehnung (literally: ‘to be modelled after’ or ‘to lean-upon’), sensitive, func-
tional, and embedded devices may be developed such that ‘active’ and ‘passive’ 
roles (as Freudians once phrased it) may become a matter of choice or mood rather 
than of anatomical destiny. It is no coincidence perhaps that, precisely now that 
the ‘phallic woman’ phantasm is becoming technologically plausible, this same 
scenario also emerges as something already biologically real; although the ques-
tion remains whether the transfiguration of the phallic object into a gadget would 
indeed subvert or rather expose (or reinforce) the (traditional) psychoanalytic 
image of phallic pleasure as a gendered ‘privilege.’
Finally, the availability of retinal and cochlear implants may affect the way 
we assess and experience our natural eyes and ears, as embedded and sophisticat-
ed, but at the same time increasingly replaceable and optimisable contrivances, so 
that smart implants may allow us to fill the gaps, remove the blind spots, increase 
resolution, broaden the spectrum of detectable frequencies, or equip ourselves 
with an additional (movable) third eye or ear. The availability of micro-implants 
may point attention to gaps we hardly realised were there, such as our inability to 
discern infra-red light, only noticeable to us as heat. Once installed, however, the 
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gadget may take on a life of its own. A third eye, for instance, may (willingly or 
unwillingly) become the incarnation of a perverse, stalking drive.
But one could argue that extimacy even goes much further back in the history 
of life and that mitochondria (as powerhouses of eukaryotic cells) may count as 
the most primordial version of the extimate ‘intruder.’ The theory is that they once 
entered the eukaryotic cell as invading (or absorbed) bacteria (‘symbionts’), as 
intimate and organic (biocompatible) ‘devices’ so to speak, making eukaryotic 
life possible (Lane 2005): the cellular version of the forgotten ‘other’ (but now 
incorporated rather than lost). And electronic precision devices may well single 
out mitochondria as targets of choice, to address symptoms of depression and 
fatigue, for instance, by manipulating mitochondrial functioning.
NBIC technologies operate on both sides of the matheme of desire ($ ◊ a) 
as we have seen: not only by (promising to) produce objects of desire which in-
dividuals obsessively may want to have, but also by challenging forth craving 
subjects into certain modes of being, claiming to evoke bodily jouissance in more 
immediate ways, bypassing precarious detours via culture (via others). This strat-
egy is perhaps comparable to drug use although, while drugs function as toxic 
intrusions drenching the body as a whole, precision delivery of electronic and 
molecular signals purports to sooth or suture human craving only where it hurts. 
But Lacan’s fascination with smart contrivances does not preclude the acknowl-
edgement of the inevitable fiasco of high-tech fixes as currently advertised. And 
rather than applauding the ‘death of the autonomous subject’ and the supremacy 
of an all-encompassing techno-cultural system, as Céline Lafontaine (2004; 2007) 
suggests, a Lacanian perspective emphasises the vulnerability and fragility of the 
subject vis-à-vis the cyber-informational techno-sphere and the extent to which 
desire is increasingly pre-structured by the informational circuits of the Other: 
a vulnerability which will be eclipsed (rather than surmounted) by the endorse-
ment of autonomy as an (either humanist or post-humanist ) ideal. A Lacanian 
viewpoint both highlights and problematizes the exploitation of the increased 
dependency of (supposedly plastic and malleable) individuals on informational 
networks which (in neo-liberal societies) purport to liberate and empower them 
(Lemmens 2015). Although the realm of the symbolical is increasingly embedded 
in gadgets (as exemplifications of the informational logic currently holding sway), 
it will nonetheless fail to completely erase the other basic dimensions of human 
subjectivity and desire, namely the (phantasmatic) imaginary and the (enigmatic) 
real (cf. Nusselder 2009, 69). A Lacanian way out would be to endorse a Heideg-
gerian ethos, as delineated by Gunkel and Taylor (2014): that is, instead of trying 
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to stop the advance of ‘high’ technology (whose gadgets will increasingly claim 
us), we must work through and actively question the unfolding present. And while 
cybernetics and electronics reduce language to data transmission, a Lacanian ap-
proach will eventually focus on (and even enable the emergence of) other scenes 
(either artistic or analytic) where (in the folds and margins of the system) subjects 
are actively invited to respond to their being spoken, and to articulate their desire, 
their “residue of truth,” in a more “poetic” manner (Lacan 1967–1968, 27).
Notes
This article builds on a number of lectures and profits from responses and discus-
sions at various meetings, including: “The Enhancement-Debate as a Symptom of 
Our Ontological Self-Image,” Symposium: Posthumanism and Somatechnologies 
(University of Twente, April 10, 2014); “Technology, Intervention and the Control 
of Human Beings: What Is at Stake?,” Emerging Technologies and Human Rights 
(Council of Europe, Strasbourg, May 4, 2015); “Extimate Technologies: Bio-Implants, 
Self-Management and the Uncanny” (Centre for Critical Philosophy, Ghent March 19, 
2015); and the 29th European Conference on Philosophy of Medicine and Health Care 
(Ghent, August 20, 2015).
1. http://www.thync.com/.
2. http://www.coe.int/en/web/bioethics/emerging-technologies.
3. The NBIC acronym refers to “nanotechnology, biotechnology, information 
technology, and cognitive science” as a converging research field (Roco and Bain-
bridge 2003).
4. In a recent overview of post-phenomenological philosophy of technology 
(Rosenberger and Verbeek 2015), for instance, although contemporaries such as Hei-
degger and Merleau-Ponty are elaborately discussed, Lacan is absent.
5. A comparable gadget is the iSkin concept, a skin-worn, very thin sensor over-
lay, biocompatible, flexible and stretchable, folding itself to suit various bodily loca-
tions such as finger, forearm or ear, fostering “direct, quick, and discreet input for 
mobile computing” (Wiegel et al. 2015).
6. When Watson and Crick discovered the molecular-informational structure of 
DNA and Lacan launched his weekly Seminar (Zwart 2013).
7. Here as well, Lacan refers to the severed breasts of Sainte Agatha (using 
Giovanni Batista Tiepolo’s version on this occasion) to emphasise that the irretriev-
ably lost object can only be envisioned at the very moment of its disappearance, as a 
transient snapshot, such as in the case of falling stars at night, or elementary particles 
in cloud chambers, or a paralysing, captivating glance, spotted briefly and in passing.
8. This idea was elaborated by Peter Sloterdijk (1998, 487ff.), both building on 
and criticising Lacan (Sloterdijk and Heinrichs 2001, 12ff.).
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9. At one time a widespread practice to which Jean-Jacques Rousseau (as a true 
Romantic) vehemently objected, in one of the first scholarly publications devoted to 
this subject.
10. Lacan repeatedly refers to Donald Winnicott, who sees childhood toys and 
dolls (such as teddy bears) as transitional objects (both external and intimate, both real 
and illusory) which may soothe and facilitate the inevitable destruction of the symbi-
otic mother-child relationship by temporarily replacing the object a. A fetish, Lacan 
adds, is basically a frozen transitory object for adults (Lacan1967–1968, 35–36; 1994, 
34–35).
11. Building on Aristophanes’s parable in Symposium, Lacan further explores 
this experience of profound loss by arguing that it gives rise to a “lamella,” an ultra-
thin surface (Lacan 1966–1967, 847; 1973, 222), a flexible remainder of the traumatic 
cut, a two-dimensional, fictitious ‘organ,’ attaching itself (as a highly sensitive film) 
to corporeal orifices (mouth, anus, the inner mucosa of vagina or penis, etc.), thereby 
creating erogenous zones, instilling in human individuals a yearning for something to 
which they somehow seem entitled and which they apparently cannot do without.
12. In one of his seminars, Lacan speaks about the Apollo project. The astro-
nauts, he argues, having left the field of gravity of planet Earth, still remain within 
the techno-scientific realm of communication technologies (Lacan 1991, 187). During 
their space-journey, they are accompanied by the electronic version of a human voice: 
their auditory connection with Houston (the Big Other): their auditory object a. As 
long as this connection is alive, they will survive (188).
13. Aquinas 1922, Pars 1a 2ae, Quaestio XIII, second article.
14. One explanation of the origin of the number zero is that it represents the 
empty hollow left by a counting stone in the sand (Kaplan 1999, 25).
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